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A Question of (Anti)trust:
Flood v. Kuhn and the Viability of Major League Baseball's Antitrust Exemption
William Basil Tsimpris1
Introduction
Jacques Barzun once commented that "[w]hoever wants to know the heart and
mind of America had better learn baseball., 2  Taken literally, this assertion is short-
sighted,3 and in today's society "the national pastime" has long ceded its status as
America's dominant team sport.4 In one area, though, baseball still holds a distinction
other sports cannot claim: Throughout much of its history, Major League Baseball
(hereinfter "MLB") has enjoyed a judicially-created exemption from federal antitrust
laws, an exemption not afforded to other sports.
5
This casenote will examine the history and strength of the MLB antitrust
exemption from the perspective of Flood v. Kuhn, in which the United States Supreme
Court upheld MLB's reserve system by classifying baseball's status as an "exception"
under federal antitrust laws.6 In addition, this casenote will examine the effect on MLB,
its players, its member cities, its prospective member cities, its fans, and the public at
large, created by the passage of the Curt Flood Act of 1998, which dissolved the
exemption only as far as it inhibited the employment rights of players under federal
antitrust law.7
Flood v. Kuhn: The Court Takes Strike Three
Curtis Charles Flood entered the major leagues in 1956 with the Cincinnati Reds.
Within two years, after being traded to the St. Louis Cardinals, Flood became a fixture in
the Cardinals' lineup and represented the team in three All-Star games. 8 Flood played
1 J.D. University of Richmond T.C. Williams School of Law 2004.
2 Jules Tygiel, Introduction to JULES TYGIEL, PAST TIME: BASEBALL AS HISTORY, at ix (2000).
3 See id Tygiel comments that "people with a total ignorance of baseball have written many fine books on
American society and culture."
4See, e.g., Sports Fans of America, Sports Popularity: Football is King!, at
http://www.sportsfansofamerica.com/Interactive/Editorials/Fans/Popularity.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003)
(noting that football out polls baseball 44% to 17% as the most popular team sport, with the Super Bowl,
beating the World Series by a margin of 41% to 19%).
5 Cf Radovich v. Nat'l Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (limiting the exemption specifically to the
business of organized baseball). See generally Haywood v. Nat'l Basketball Ass'n, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971)
(professional basketball); United States v. Int'l Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955) (professional boxing);
Deesen v. Prof 1 Golfers' Ass'n., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir. 1966) (professional golf); Peto v. Madison Square
Garden Corp., 1958 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69, 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (professional hockey).
6 Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 281 (1972).
715 U.S.C. § 27(b) (2003).
8 See TOTAL BASEBALL 863 (John Thorn et al., eds., 6th ed. 1999); see also BILL JAMES, THE NEW BILL
JAMES, HISTORICAL BASEBALL ABSTRACT 747 (2001) (noted baseball historian and statistician Bill James
rates Flood the thirty-sixth best centerfielder of all time).
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under a set of labor rules formed during the 1903 "peace treaty" between the warring
American and National Leagues, most notable for a "reserve clause" that adhered a player
to the team holding his contract and prohibited him from working for the employer of his
choice. 9  Under the reserve system, organized baseball created a single-employer-
dominated "monopsony," in which a player was his club's property for as long as he
played baseball or until his employer assigned his contract to another club or "released"
the player from his services.10 Despite playing in a league that demanded conformity to
the reserve system, Flood was a fiercely independent thinker, and he told teammates that
he would refuse to go to another team if the Cardinals traded him and that he would quit
baseball before he left St. Louis."
1
The Cardinals traded Flood to Philadelphia in October of 1969, after Flood had a
sub-par season.12 Flood desired not to move his family and leave his business interests in
St. Louis, and he certainly did not want to finish his career playing before Philadelphia
crowds that earned a reputation among ballplayers for being harsh to African-American
players. 13 Thus, a month after the trade, Flood informed Marvin Miller, director of the
burgeoning MLB Players' Association, that he intended to challenge the reserve system
in court. 14 On Christmas Eve 1969, Flood mailed a letter to MLB Commissioner Bowie
Kuhn, in which Flood announced:
I do not feel that I am a piece of property to be bought and sold
irrespective of my wishes. I believe that any system that produces that
result violates my basic rights as a citizen and is inconsistent with the laws
of the United States and the several states....
... I, therefore, request that you make known to all the major league clubs
my feelings in this matter, and advise them of my availability for the 1970
season.
15
District Court Proceedings
Flood brought suit in the Southern District of New York against Kuhn, the MLB
clubs, and various league executives, seeking a preliminary injunction enjoining each
9See generally ROGER I. ABRAMS, LEGAL BASES: BASEBALL AND THE LAW 45, 64-69 (Temple University
Press 1998).
10 Id. at 46-47 (identifying employers as member clubs of a private cartel attempting to suppress player
salaries to protect team profitability). Team owners enforced the reserve system by interpreting Section
10A of the Uniform Players Contract to grant the clubs perpetual one-year option rights, thus never
allowing a player to relinquish himself from contractual obligation. See generally JOHN HELYAR, LORDS
OF THE REALM 35-36 (1994). The National League's use of the reserve clause predates the 1903 truce. See
Metro. Exhibition Co. v. Ewing, 42 F. 198 (S.D.N.Y. 1890) (affirming the necessity of the reserve clause
and its collusive impact).
HELYAR, supra note 10, at 107.
12Id. at 108.
13 ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 65.
14 HELYAR, supra note 10, at 108.
15 Id. at 108-09.
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baseball club from refusing to offer him employment as a player. 16 He also sought treble
damages in addition to injunctive relief.17  District Court Judge Cooper denied the
preliminary injunction, concluding: "Baseball's status in the life of the nation is so
pervasive that it would not strain credulity to say the Court can take judicial notice that
baseball is everybody's business .... The game is on higher ground; it behooves every
one to keep it there."'18 Such nostalgic reference to the national pastime foreshadowed a
significant theme in the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Flood.19
At trial, held in May-June 1970, Flood brought four causes of action. The first
cause of action alleged that the reserve system constituted a conspiracy among the
defendants to boycott and prevent him from playing baseball other than for the
Philadelphia club in violation of the Sherman and Clayton Anti-Trust Acts.20 The second
and third causes of action were state law claims against eleven of the twenty-four clubs
with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship; specifically, the second contended that
the reserve system violated the antitrust laws of New York, California and the other states
where major league baseball is played and also violated state civil rights statutes, while
the third contended that by the reserve system MLB had restrained Flood's "free exercise
of playing professional baseball in New York, California, and the several states" in which
MLB staged baseball games, in violation of the common law.21 The fourth cause of
action asserted that the reserve system was a form of peonage and involuntary servitude
in violation of the anti-peonage statutes and the Thirteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, and that it deprived him of "freedom of labor" in violation of the
Norris LaGuardia Act.22 Judge Cooper focused primarily on the first cause of action.
The court ruled against Flood on two primary bases. First, Judge Cooper found
that "the preponderance of credible proof d[id] not favor elimination of the reserve
clause. 2 4 Whereas Judge Cooper anticipated testimony that the reserve clause had been
abused and should be abolished, he was struck by the fact that testimony at trial failed to
support that criticism, to the point that Flood's own witnesses did not consider the system
wholly undesirable.25  Second, Judge Cooper held that Federal Baseball Club of
16 Flood v. Kuhn, 309 F. Supp. 793, 795 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
171d. at 795 n.1.
18Id. at 797.
19See ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 66. The first section of the Court's opinion in Flood, entitled "The Game,"
pays homage to the pastime by referring to at least 100 celebrated names from the game's history, as well
as baseball poems such as "Casey at the Bat" and "Tinker to Evers to Chance." Flood, 407 U.S. at 260-64.
20 Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271, 272 (1970).
21 Id
22 Id. Flood's post-trial brief removed contentions of peonage conditions or Norris-LaGuardia Act
violations. See id. at 280 n. 15. Judge Cooper considered the contentions nevertheless and concluded them
to be inapplicable.
23 Id. at 280 (stating that the reserve system was not a matter appropriate for a diversity of treatment, and
that state and local laws may not unduly burden interstate commerce).
2 4 Id. at 276.
25 Id. (baseball legend and pioneer Jackie Robinson testified that he favored "modifications" of the system,
but did not favor its destruction.
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Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs26 and Toolson v. New
York Yankees, Inc. 27 were controlling. 28 Judge Cooper concluded that "the reserve clause
can be fashioned so as to find acceptance by player and club. 2 9
The Second Circuit's Decision
On appeal, the Second Circuit held fast to the Federal Baseball-Toolson legacy
and felt "compelled to affirm."3
Federal Baseball arose from the demise of the rival Federal League, which began
in 1913 as a minor league and announced near the end of the season that it would
challenge the American and National Leagues as a third major league.31 The Federal
League obtained the backing of several wealthy businessman and offered contracts to
MLB stars.32 The competition created in the baseball marketplace by the Federal League
proved a godsend for players and a headache for MLB owners, who suddenly needed to
escalate salaries and add other benefits in order to keep their marquee players from
jumping ship.33 MLB teams threatened that any defectors would be blacklisted, but the
Federal League still attracted eighty-one major leaguers during its two seasons, several of
whom defected to the Federal League and then returned to MLB and increased their
salaries with each change. 34  Despite the inroads it achieved, the Federal League
members decided to sue MLB in federal court, claiming the established structure of the
American-National League framework was both a conspiracy and monopoly in violation
of federal antitrust laws.
35
26 259 U.S. 200 (1922) (hereinafter Federal Baseball) (holding that baseball competitions were not
commerce and thus baseball was purely a state affair, because although competitions between clubs
required extensive and frequent travel of players and umpires across state lines, such travel was merely
incidental to the baseball competitions).
27 346 U.S. 356 (1953) (hereinafter Toolson) (holding that MLB had been left for thirty years to develop
after Federal Baseball, on the understanding that it was not subject to existing antitrust legislation, and "if
there are evils in this field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it should be by
legislation").
28 Flood, 316 F. Supp. at 276-78.
29 Id. at 284.
30 Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264, 265 (1971).
31 See generally ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 53-57. The Federal League intended to place franchises in
Buffalo, Baltimore, Brooklyn, Chicago, St. Louis, Pittsburgh, Indianapolis, and Cincinnati, beginning in
1914. Id. at 53.
32 Id.
33HELYAR, supra note 10, at 4. Helyar reports that the average salary doubled between the years 1913-15.
For example, Ty Cobb received a salary over double the league average, and Tris Speaker received an
unheard-of two-year contract. Id.
34ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 54-55.
3 5 Id. at55.
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The presiding district court judge, Kenesaw Mountain Landis, who had developed
a reputation as a "trustbuster,"36 appeared on the surface to be amenable to the Federal
League's claims; however, Judge Landis was also a staunch baseball devotee. 37 After the
trial ended, Judge Landis withheld his opinion, hoping the parties would settle out of
38court. Judge Landis never produced the opinion, and as the Federal League suffered
financial decline in its second year of existence, it settled for a modest cash settlement
and quickly went out of business.
39
While some Federal League owners fared well in the settlement, the Baltimore
club did not, and it then brought an antitrust suit in federal court in the District of
Columbia against MLB owners and three of the Federal League owners.40 The Baltimore
club alleged violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts, won an $80,000 verdict, and
received treble damages from the trial court. 41 However, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reversed the trial court, determining baseball to be outside the scope
of the antitrust laws.42 The Baltimore club appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court affirmed the Second Circuit determination, as "Federal Baseball was
not one of Mr. Justice Holmes' happiest days."43  Speaking for a unanimous Court,
Justice Holmes wrote:
The business is giving exhibitions of baseball, which are purely state
affairs.... But the fact that in order to give exhibitions the Leagues must
induce free persons to cross state lines and must arrange and pay for their
doing so is not enough to change the character of the business .... [T]he
transport is a mere incident, not the essential thing. That to which it is
incident, the exhibition, although made for money would not be called
trade or commerce in the commonly accepted use of those words .... To
repeat the illustrations given by the Court below, a firm of lawyers
sending out a member to argue a case, or the Chautauqual lecture bureau
36 Id. Landis had first earned renown in 1907, when he found Standard Oil guilty of violating the Sherman
Antitrust Act and fined the company $29.2 million. See HELYAR, supra note 10, at 5.
37HELYAR, supra note 10, at 6 (noting that Landis interrupted during the trial to declare, "Both sides must
understand that any blows at the thing called baseball would be regarded by this court as a blow to the
national institution.").3 8 Id. at 6.
39 Id. Landis became reacquainted with MLB five years later, when he became its commissioner.
40 See ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 56.
41 William C. Dunning, Note, Antitrust Law: Baseball, 10 SETON HALL J. SPORTS L. 167, 173 (2000).
42 Id.
43 Salerno v. American League of Prof 1 Baseball Clubs, 429 F.2d 1003, 1005 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1001 (1971); cf Flood, 407 U.S. at 282 (stating that "[p]rofessional baseball is a business and it is
engaged in interstate commerce"); HELYAR, supra note 10, at 8 (characterizing Justice Holmes' reasoning
as based on "a piece of fiction, one that would grow sillier with each passing year"). But cf Flood, 407
U.S. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (noting that in 1922, when Federal Baseball was decided, "the Court
had a narrow, parochial view of commerce").
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sending out lecturers, does not engage in such commerce because the
lawyer or lecturer goes to another State.
44
Thus, because organized professional baseball did not involve interstate commerce, the
Federal Baseball court held that MLB was not subject to federal antitrust laws and the
Baltimore club had no basis for recovery.
45
Toolson involved much less elaboration by the Court; in fact, the per curiam
opinion took only one paragraph to dispose of the appeal in MLB's favor. The New York
Yankees had reassigned Toolson from its minor league affiliate in Newark to another
club, but Toolson refused to report and filed suit under the antitrust laws. 46 Based on the
precedent set by Federal League, the lower courts found in MLB's favor. 47  These
decisions did not consider the many changes the game had undergone since 1922,
including
its radio and television activities which expand[ed] its game audiences
beyond state lines, its sponsorship of interstate advertising, and its highly
organized "farm system" of minor league baseball clubs, coupled with
restrictive contracts and understandings between individuals and among
clubs or leagues playing for profit throughout the United States, and even
in Canada, Mexico and Cuba.
48
Nevertheless, because Congress had taken no action to correct the Federal League
decision in the intervening three decades, the Court concluded that "Congress had no
intention of including the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust
laws. 4
9
Based on the force of the Federal Baseball and Toolson holdings, the Second
Circuit surmised that there was "no likelihood" that the Supreme Court would overrule
those decisions and reiterated the Toolson theme that "[b]aseball's welfare and future
should not be for politically insulated interpreters of technical antitrust statutes but rather
should be for the voters through their elected representatives."
50
Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at 208-09.
45See, e.g., Morgen A. Sullivan, Note, "A Derelict in the Stream of the Law": Overruling Baseball's
Antitrust Exemption, 48 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1270-71 (1999). Congress, in 1890, enacted the Sherman
Antitrust Act, prohibiting "any contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade." The Sherman Act
enabled the federal government to prohibit such collusion, and in 1914, Congress passed the Clayton
Antitrust Act, which enabled private parties to recover for damages caused by anti-competitive conduct.
See generally, ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 48-50.
46 See generally ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 60-61.
47 Id. at 60.
48 Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357-58 (Burton, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 356-57.
50 Flood, 443 F.2d at 272 (Moore, J., concurring).
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The United States Supreme Court's Decision
The Flood court made eight specific findings, most of which appeared favorable
to Flood.51 However, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion also noted that even if the
baseball exemption was an aberration, it was "an aberration that has been with us now for
half a century, one heretofore deemed fully entitled to the benefit of stare decisis, and
one that has survived the Court's expanding concept of interstate commerce."52 After a
thorough review of the Federal Baseball-Toolson holdings, as well as an analysis of
antitrust decisions involving other sports53 and legislative proposals introduced relative to
the applicability of antitrust laws to baseball that had failed in Congress since Toolson,
Justice Blackmun concluded that "any inconsistency or illogic ... is an inconsistency and
illogic of long standing that is to be remedied by the Congress and not by this Court. '54
On the basis of Congress's "positive inaction," the Court upheld baseball's judicially-
created federal antitrust exemption.
55
The usage of the positive inaction doctrine was not fully persuasive, even among
all Court members voting in the majority. 56 Indeed, prior to Toolson, the Court had
expressed skepticism of basing its decision on congressional inaction.5 7 For instance, in
Helvering v. Hallock8 the Court discussed stare decisis with regard to statutory
interpretation:
It would require very persuasive circumstances enveloping Congressional
silence to debar this Court from re-examining its own doctrines. To
explain the cause of non-action by Congress when Congress itself sheds
no light is to venture into speculative unrealities .... This Court ... has
from the beginning rejected a doctrine of disability at self-correction. 59
As the Hallock court recognized, congressional inaction on an erroneous decision
should not influence the judiciary's ability to reexamine its own precedent, as legislators
often communicate more than mere unawareness or acquiescence when they fail to act on
51 For instance, the Court found that baseball is a business engaged in interstate commerce, the exemption
MLB enjoyed was an anomaly, other professional sports operating interstate enjoy no exemption, and the
advent of radio and television have only increased interstate coverage. Flood, 407 U.S. at 282-84.52 Id. at 283.
53See cases cited supra note 5.
54 Flood, 407 U.S. at 284.
55 Id. at 283-84 (stating that Congress, "far beyond mere inference and implication, has clearly evinced a
desire not to disapprove" of the exemption legislatively).
56 Id. at 286 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (stating that congressional inaction was not a solid basis for the
Court's holding, "but the least undesirable course now is to let the matter rest with Congress" to solve the
problem).
57 Sullivan, supra note 45, at 1276.
58 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
59 Id. at 119-121 (footnotes omitted). But cf Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 488 (1940)
(commenting, in a case not regarding baseball's antitrust exemption, that the "long time failure of Congress
to alter the [Sherman] Act after it had been judicially construed ... is persuasive evidence of legislative
recognition that the judicial construction is the correct one").
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a court's holding; for example, parliamentary tactics and strategy may undergird
congressional silence based on political procedural considerations rather than the
acceptance of a court decision.60  In addition, another factor that may influence
congressional action or inaction is lobbying, and by 1950, MLB had assembled an
impressive lobbying force on Capitol Hill. 6 1 The "Danny Gardella scare, 62 demonstrates
the ambiguity involved in congressional inaction.
Following the end of World War II, the newly-formed Mexican League attempted
to lure established major leaguers, just as the Federal League had done thirty years
earlier; the new competition, "albeit remote and fleeting," irritated the MLB
establishment, which was already negotiating a pension fund with the Players' Guild, the
predecessor to the Players' Association. 63  In June 1946, Happy Chandler, Landis'
successor as MLB commissioner, announced a "five-year ban on all U.S. players who
jumped to the Mexican League. 64 Gardella jumped from the New York Giants to the
Mexican League for $8,000 a year, plus a $5,000 signing bonus that matched his base
salary in New York, but he soon found the playing conditions in Mexico intolerable and
attempted to return to MLB.65 Gardella was blacklisted and sued MLB for $300,000, but
the district court found for MLB on the strength of Federal Baseball.66
On appeal, the Second Circuit acknowledged a valid argument existed that the
Supreme Court's recent decisions 67 had "completely destroyed the vitality" of Federal
Baseball and had left "that case but an impotent zombie[e]. 68 It chose not to disregard
Federal Baseball, though, but to distinguish it from Gardella's appeal, which arose in a
vastly different factual context.69 For instance, the Second Circuit found a "distinction
necessary" in that, in Federal Baseball,
60 See Sullivan, supra note 45, at 1276-77 (citing Hallock, 309 U.S. at 121).
61 According to Representative Emanuel Cellars, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on the Study of
Monopoly Power, following 1951 hearings before his subcommittee: "I want to say.., that I have never
known, in my 35 years of experience, of as great a lobby that descended upon the House than the organized
baseball lobby.... They came upon Washington like locusts." See, e.g., ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 61.
62 See generally ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS 12-15 (2d ed. 1994).
63 Id. at 12. The Players' Guild did not galvanize vast player support other than in Pittsburgh, but it did,
among other gains, negotiate the pension fund, secure an increased minimum salary, and establish a
maximum pay cut.
Id. at 12-13.
65Id at 13.
66 Id.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Frankfurt Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) (stating that, "with
reference to commercial trade restraints ... Congress, in passing the Sherman Act, left no area of its
constitutional power unoccupied"); United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558-
59 (1944) (explaining that "Congress wanted to go to the utmost extent of its Constitutional power in
restraining trust and monopoly agreements... so far as Congress could [ensure] under our dual system, a
competitive business economy"); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435
(1932) (indicating that, with an exception as to labor unions, Congress in the Sherman Act intended to use
all the power conferred on it by the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution).
68 Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402, 408-09 (1949) (Frank, J., concurring).
Id. at 411.
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Persons in other states received, via the telegraph, mere accounts of the
games as told by others, while here we have the very substantially
different fact of instant and direct interstate transmission, via television, of
the games as they are being played, so that audiences in other states have
the experience of being virtually present at these games.
70
Such a vast difference in degree, the court reasoned, constituted a difference in kind
sufficient to distinguish the Federal Baseball decision.7 1 Further, if the players labored
under conditions that rendered them "quasi-peons, it is of no moment that they are well
paid; only the totalitarian-minded will believe that high pay excuses virtual slavery."
72
The Second Circuit made no finding on the necessity of the reserve clause, instead
concluding that "the public's pleasure does not authorize the courts to condone illegality,
and . . . no court should strive ingeniously to legalize a private (even if benevolent)
dictatorship."73
Despite the adverse ruling, MLB decided not to petition the Supreme Court for
Gardella's appeal. Instead, Chandler granted amnesty to the Mexican League jumpers
and settled out of court with Gardella.74 MLB then focused its efforts on the House
Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power, seeking a legislative stamp of approval
of its exemption. 75 As in Flood's litigation twenty years later, former players "testified
that the reserve clause was necessary to preserve competitive balance." 76  National
League president Ford Frick likened the reserve clause to the loyalty exhibited in Milton
Berle's thirty-year movie studio contract. 77 The hearings concluded without the adoption
7 0 Id. at 412.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 410. Player salaries have been deemed excessive since the first time bat impacted with ball.
Albert Spalding supplied the first recorded owner's complaint over salaries in 1881: "Professional baseball
is on the wane. Salaries must come down or the interest of the public must be increased in some way. If
one or the other does not happen, bankruptcy stares every team in the face." HELYAR, supra note 10, at 2-
3.
73 Gardella, 172 F.2d at 415.
74ZIMBALIST, supra note 62, at 13. Interestingly, despite being awarded $300,000 by the Second Circuit,
Gardella settled with MLB for $60,000, splitting that amount with his attorney.
75 Id. When the hearings began, "eight antitrust cases were pending against MLB, as well as three bills that
would have legislated the antitrust exemption to baseball and other sports." Id.
76 Id at 13-14. Zimbalist, a prominent sports economist, finds it "remarkable that, given the prevalence of
player sales throughout the years, the reserve clause/competitive balance myth was so tenacious." Id. at 14.
According to Zimbalist, economist Simon Rottenberg in 1956 demonstrated that "as long as player sales
were allowed, baseball talent would be distributed according to the various teams' ability and willingness to
pay," regardless of a reserve clause. Id. Cf BILL JAMES, A History of Being a Kansas City Baseball Fan,
in THE BILL JAMES BASEBALL ABSTRACT 1986 at 39, 40-41 (1986) (noting that since Kansas City Athletics
owner Arnold Johnson was a close friend of Yankees co-owner Del Webb, the fact that the Athletics sold to
New York many of the mainstays of the 1950s and 60s Yankee dynasty, such as Roger Maris, was not
surprising).
77ZIMBALIST, supra note 62, at 14. Frick neglected to mention that Berle was able to choose among
competing offers and had long-term employment stability. Cf Joe Sheehan, The Daily Prospectus:
Loyalty, Baseball Prospectus Publishing Group, at
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of any legislation.78 Likewise, none of the 1950's bills challenging baseball's exemption
ever made it out of committee in either chamber.
7 9
Against this background, Justices Douglas and Marshall composed dissenting
opinions in Flood, both joined by Justice Brennan. Justice Douglas, a member of the
majority in Toolson, commented that Federal Baseball was "a derelict in the stream of
the law that we, its creator, should remove." 80 He cited the "demise of the old landmarks"
of interstate commerce jurisprudence 81 for the proposition that the Court's concept of
commerce had evolved since Federal Baseball, then he noted that baseball had become a
"big business that is packaged with beer, with broadcasting, and with other industries."
8 2
Largely disregarding the majority's reliance upon congressional inaction, Justice Douglas
reminded the Court that the only professional sports antitrust statutory exemption granted
by Congress was limited to broadcasting rights,83 and he concluded that the Court should
not "ascribe a broader exemption through inaction than Congress has seen fit to grant
explicitly. 8
4
Justice Marshall considered Flood a difficult case because it forced the Court to
weigh the principle of stare decisis with the knowledge that the Federal Baseball and
Toolson decisions were "totally at odds with more recent and better reasoned cases."85
However, he noted that Kuhn himself admitted that MLB engaged in interstate
commerce, thus leaving Federal Baseball-Toolson completely at odds with the Radovich-
International Boxing line of opinions applying antitrust laws to other professional sports.
Justice Marshall wrote:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the
Magna Carta of free enterprise. They are as important to the preservation
of economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights
is to the protection of our fundamental personal freedoms .... Implicit in
such freedom is the notion that it cannot be foreclosed with respect to one
sector of the economy because certain private citizens or groups believe
http://www.baseballprospectus.com/news/20010731 daily.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003). Sheehan
responds to the axiom that today's players, by exercising their free agency rights, lack the loyalty of their
predecessors, by asserting that "[s]taying with one team for a long period of time [did not] reflect loyalty: it
reflected the reserve clause." In addition, Sheehan notes that teams were not loyal "any longer than they
needed to be," as even legends such as Babe Ruth and Ty Cobb were jettisoned by their teams once their
skills waned.
78 ZIMBALIST, supra note 62, at 14. Zimbalist notes that according to the congressional testimony of a
players' attorney during the 1981 baseball strike, Representative Celler's subcommittee believed that
Gardella had superseded Federal Baseball, and that if no legislation were adopted, the sport would be
subject to federal antitrust law.
Id.
80 Flood, 407 U.S. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
81 See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
82 Flood, 407 U.S. at 286-87.
83 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (2000).
84 Flood, 407 U.S. at 288.
85 Id. at 290 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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that such foreclosure might promote greater competition in a more
important sector of the economy.
86
Justice Marshall regarded the protections under antitrust laws as just as important
to baseball players as they were to football players, or any other citizen; thus, ballplayers
should not "be denied the benefits of competition merely because club owners view other
economic interests as being more important, unless Congress says So. ' 87 He reasoned
that congressional action would have been a significant factor to consider only if the
Court had been consistent and treated all sports in the same way baseball was treated, but
the Court's correction starting with Radovich and International Boxing signified to
Congress that baseball's exemption required the Court's action.
88
Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun's majority opinion ended Flood's litigation
against MLB. The Court had boxed itself in after Federal Baseball, taking pains to
distinguish baseball from other matters, 89 and the Court refused to start anew with Flood.
As it turned out, Flood never played a game for the Philadelphia Phillies. After the 1970
season, the Phillies sold Flood's rights to the Washington Senators.90 Flood agreed to
terms with Washington for the 1971 season, played thirteen games, and then retired.91
His position on the reserve clause is associated not only with the game of baseball but
also with the broader progressive era in which he lived.92
Post-Flood: What's the Score?
A misperception exists that Curt Flood's case led directly to free agency. In
reality, it gave baseball players certain knowledge that the antitrust door would not
open. 93 Instead, as a result of a petition filed by American League umpires, the National
Labor Relations Board in "what must be considered one of the greatest upsets in the
history of baseball and the legal process," voted four-to-one to take jurisdiction over
MLB, and "spumed the Federal Baseball precedent as an aged artifact."94 On December
86 Id. at 291-92 (quoting United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)).
8 7 Id. at 292.
88 See id Note, though, that Marshall did not speculate whether Flood "would necessarily prevail," as
MLB argued that the appointment of Players' Association as the representative for all major league players
as a mandatory subject of the collective bargaining agreement dictated that federal labor statutes, not
federal antitrust laws, were applicable. The lower courts solely considered the case on the basis of the
antitrust exemption. Id. at 294.
89 See ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 68-69.
90 Flood, 407 U.S. at 266.
91 See TOTAL BASEBALL, supra note 8, at 863.
92 See, e.g., A. Asadullah Samad, Curt Flood: Baseball's Great Emancipator, at
http://afgen.com/curt flood.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003). According to Samad, "the message Curt
Flood left wasn't about playing baseball, which he loved to do. It was about maintaining his humanity,
which he had to do.... [P]rofessional sports may have killed the career of the messenger, but they couldn't
kill his message: A man is not a slave to a game, nor is he chattel."
93See JAMES, supra note 8, at 748.
ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 77.
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13, 1974, federal arbitrator Peter Seitz, acting on a dispute between Oakland owner
Charles Finley and pitcher Jim "Catfish" Hunter over Finley's failure to pay on an
insurance policy as dictated in Hunter's contract, ruled that Hunter's "contract for service
to be performed during the 1975 season no longer binds him and he is a free agent.
9 5
One year later, in "the most important single act in the history of the business and law of
baseball," Seitz granted Los Angeles Dodgers pitcher Andy Messersmith's grievance and
ruled that he was free of the reserve system.96 Player upon player served out his option
year and entered the open market.97 This occurred although the Supreme Court has never
again considered baseball's exemption.
MLB Finances
After federal arbitrators determined that, in three successive off-seasons, the
owners had colluded in order to create "no vestige of a free market,"98 the Antitrust
Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings in December 1992
concerning baseball's antitrust exemption. Smith College economist Andrew Zimbalist
provided the subcommittee with his written testimony.99 Zimbalist articulated and
attempted to refute justifications for the exemption asserted by ownership; several of the
justifications are still of interest to the public over ten years later, as they are corrupted by
either fallacy or deception. For instance, MLB owners have defended the antitrust
exemption on the ground that MLB is not profitable and is thus not a typical business.
00
The owners claim that if they do not make a profit, then it cannot be argued that they are
abusing the monopoly the exception confers. 1 1 Moreover, this unprofitability is often
framed in terms of "passing the loss" on to the fans. 10 2 It does not take a cynical mind to
notice that such claims of unprofitability engender calls from the media for a salary cap,
95HELYAR, supra note 10, at 148-49.
96 ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 126. Not surprisingly, MLB owners fired Seitz as the permanent contract
arbitrator five minutes after receiving notice of his decision. Id. at 127.
97MLB initially attempted to interpret Seitz's Messersmith decision as only applying to Messersmith.
Oakland owner Charles Finley, on the other hand, spoke out as the lone management voice advocating total
free agency, so as to flood the market and drive salaries down. The players and owners eventually agreed
to keep the reserve clause intact in limited form, allowing free agent rights after six years of MLB service.
See HELYAR, supra note 10, at 182-83.
98 See generally ABRAMS, supra note 9, at 137-50. The owners violated Article 18 of the collective
bargaining agreement, which read: "Players shall not act in concert with other Players and Clubs shall not
act in concert with other Clubs." Interestingly, the clause was inserted in the CBA at management request.
Id. at 138. The parties settled damages at $280 million, but if antitrust principles had applied, the Players'
Association would have been entitled to triple the damages. The 1990 and subsequent CBAs have included
this provision, so it is now a non-issue in terms of the Sherman Act. See ZIMBALIST, supra note 10, at 179.
99See generally Andrew Zimbalist, Congressional Hearing: Baseball Economics and Antitrust Immunity, 4
SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 287 (1994) (providing an edited and expanded transcript of his testimony).
100 Id. at 296.
101 IdId
102See, e.g., Richard C. Levin et al., The Report of the Independent Members of the Commissioner s Blue
Ribbon Panel on Baseball Economics 1 (2000), at http://www.mlb.com/mlb/downloads/blue ribbon.pdf
(identifying the committee as "representing the interests of baseball fans" and reporting that "the costs of the
clubs trying to be competitive is causing escalation of ticket and concession prices, jeopardizing MLB's
traditional position as the affordable family spectator sport").
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which the owners have not won in bargaining with the Players' Association, in accord
with those imposed in other professional team sports.
10 3
Historically, owners' claims of unprofitability have been largely overstated or
unsubstantiated. 10 4 For example, in 1985 then-MLB commissioner Peter Ueberroth, in a
bargaining gesture designed to demonstrate to the players the extent of the owners' red
ink, opened the teams' books to Stanford University economist Roger Noll.10 5  As
Ueberroth presented the finances to Noll, twenty-one of twenty-six teams had lost money
in 1984.106 However, Noll found bookkeeping tricks at every turn, and he refrained a
purported combined operating loss of $41 million as a $25 million operating profit. 0 7
Dubious numbers jumped out at Noll. For instance, Noll discovered that Ted
Turner's Atlanta Braves were paid only $1 million for television rights by Turner's
WTBS Superstation, whereas a reasonable valuation would have given the Braves at least
the league average of $2.7 million. 10 8  The Cardinals, despite being owned by beer
magnate Anheuser-Busch, reported no revenue from concessions and parking, but
another Anheuser-Busch subsidiary collected $2.5 million in revenue for these goods and
services.10 9  The New York Yankees' $9 million loss included owner George
Steinbrenner's real estate investments in Tampa and $500,000 in charity contributions. 10
The Oakland A's spent $4.2 million in marketing expenses, the highest such figure in the
majors, for just $7.5 million in gate receipts."' l The Los Angeles Dodgers' front-office
103 See, e.g., BOB COSTAS, FAIR BALL: A FAN'S CASE FOR BASEBALL 53 (2000) (stating that under the
National Basketball Association's model, which includes a salary cap, fans of every team have reason to
believe they have a chance to win, and this is "accomplished without a single sighting of an NBA player
holding a tin cup on a street comer"). A simple look at the NBA's standings at the end of each season
renders Costas' claim as somewhat dubious. Poor NBA teams routinely win less than twenty-five percent
of their games. See, e.g., Basketball Reference, at http:www.basketballreference.com/leagues (last
accessed July 26, 2004). On the other hand, the last MLB team to win only twenty-five percent of its
games was the comically poor 1962 New York Mets. See, e.g., Baseball Almanac, at http://baseball-
almanac.com/teams/mets.shtml (last accessed July 26, 2004). Furthermore, a team that "achieves" MLB's
benchmark for a terrible season (100 losses) still wins thirty-eight percent of its games. See, e.g., Drew
Olson, Questions and Answers, J. SENTINEL ONLINE (Sept. 2002), at
http:www.jsonline.com/sports/brew/sep02/71329.asp. Costas may be conflating the NBA's salary cap with
the NBA's eight additional playoff slots, which naturally gives more marginal teams hope for the
postseason.
104 See generally David Grabiner, Frequently Asked Questions About the Baseball Labor Negotiations, at
http://remarque.org/-grabiner/laborfaq.html (last modified Aug. 28, 2002). Costas believes that while
owners' claims of "the sky is falling" in the past may have lacked credibility, the economic reality now
matches the rhetoric. COSTAS, supra note 103, at 87.
105 See HELYAR, supra note 10, at 346-47. It should be noted that the Players' Association hired Noll to
evaluate the books. ZIMBALIST, supra note 62, at 64.
106 HELYAR, supra note 10, at 347.
107 Id
108 Id.
109 See id.
11IdilId.
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payroll was quadruple the league average and, Noll concluded, cut the Dodgers' profits
by a third."
12
Zimbalist reported that nearly two-thirds of MLB franchises had developed cross-
ownership ties with broadcasting outlets since 1986, enabling them to utilize the same
transfer-pricing schemes that the "Superstation teams" (i.e., the Braves and the Chicago
Cubs) enjoyed. 13  While such accounting practices are legitimate, 114  the
mischaracterizations of teams' profits can be used as ammunition in MLB's negotiations
with its players, its cities, and the minor leagues, as well as Congress and the courts.
115
Furthermore, Zimbalist testified that owners have dishonestly manipulated or falsified
their books by underreporting revenue or overstating costs, 116 and unlike other industries,
MLB owners can assign fifty percent of their teams' purchase price to players and then
depreciate this sum over five years. 117 Above all, Zimbalist inferred, "[i]f baseball teams
were not yielding a positive economic return, it would defy all the laws of economics for
franchise values.., to have risen so rapidly over the past two decades."
118
Evidence indicates that MLB owners' dubious financial claims are not a thing of
the past. For instance, claims of a $34 million loss in 1997 by former Florida Marlins'
owner Wayne Huizenga, who owned both the team's station and its cable television
network, yielded a more realistic assessment of a $14 million profit.119 More recently,
MLB's December 2001 financial disclosures indicated a collective operating loss of $232
million, while Forbes Magazine's annual survey of baseball economics concluded that
MLB turned a collective operating profit of $76.7 million in 2001.12° In fact, one
commentator indicated that the numbers cited in MLB's own Blue Ribbon Committee
report did not add up.
121
112 id 
.
113 See Zimbalist, supra note 99, at 297. Zimbalist's testimony far predates Disney's purchase of the
Angels, NewsCorp./FOX's purchase of the Dodgers, and the Yankees' creation of its own YES Network.
Id. at 298.
115Id. at 297.
116 Id. at 298 (noting that former Cincinnati Reds owner Marge Schott gave her car companies free
advertising in Reds' media outlets and double charged the team on its five million dollar electronic
scoreboard and its artificial turf).
117 Id. at 298-99.
118Id. at 299.
119See generally Sean Forman, Team Essay: Florida Marlins, in DON MALCOLM ET AL., BIG BAD
BASEBALL ANNUAL 1999, at http://www.bigbadbaseball.com/plus192837/marlins.html (last visited Oct. 15,
2003) (summarizing Andrew Zimbalist's research on the Florida franchise).
120See Doug Pappas, Numbers Reveal Teams Not Nearing Bankruptcy, at
http://espn.go.com/mlb/columns/misc/1388690.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003). Pappas is the chairman of
the Business of Baseball Committee of the Society for American Baseball Research.
121 See Doug Pappas, Summer 2000: Report on the Blue Ribbon Panel Report, at
http://roadsidephotos.com/baseball/blueribbon.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003). Pappas noted that, by
MLB's own figures, gross revenues increased by over $1 billion between 1995-99, while player salaries
rose by $550 million. Yet, the Blue Ribbon Committee claimed that losses increased over this period,
prompting Pappas to ask, "Where did the other $450 million go?"
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Franchise Relocation and Stadium Construction
In Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc. 122 the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld
the baseball antitrust exemption's viability with regard to the franchise relocation of the
Braves from Milwaukee to Atlanta. 123  The court held that baseball organizations'
decisions concerning agreements and rules that provided for the structure of the
organization, such as locations of league franchises, were exempt from antitrust statutes,
but also noted:
We venture to guess that this exemption does not cover every type of
business activity to which a baseball club or league might be a party and
does not protect clubs or leagues from application of the federal acts to
activities which are not incidental to the maintenance of the league
structure. 1
24
A professional sports league holds great bargaining power with current and
potential league cities in part because only a select number of metropolitan areas can
support a franchise. A franchise often benefits from this tight demand by securing a new,
publicly-funded stadium upon the threat of moving for a better deal. 125 Aside from civic
pride, municipalities build the franchises' new stadiums for four economic reasons.126
First, cities seek to create construction jobs by building a facility. 127 Second, "people
who attend games or work for the team generate new spending in the community,
expanding local employment."' 128 Third, "a team attracts tourists and companies to the
host city, further increasing local spending and jobs.', 129  Finally, local and state
governments anticipate a "'multiplier effect' as increased local income causes still more
new spending and job creation."' 30 Stadium-building advocates claim that new stadiums
result in so much economic growth, through ticket-tax revenues, concession sales taxes,
and increased property taxes, that they are self-financing.
13 1
122 144 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1966).
123 See generally Edmund P. Edmonds, Symposium, The Curt Flood Act of 1998: A Hollow Gesture After
All These Years?, 9 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 315, 319-23 (1999).
124 144 N.W.2d at 15.
125 Cf Andrew F. Hamm, Future of Oakland A " May Hinge on New Stadium, EAST BAY BUSINESS TIMES,
Feb. 6, 2003, at http://eastbay.bizjournals.com/eastbay/stories/2003/02/02/daily55.html (last visited Feb.
14, 2003) (conveying MLB commissioner Bud Selig's opinion that Oakland's stadium is outmoded and
building efforts are the responsibility of individual owners and their franchise cities).
126 Roger G. Noll & Andrew Zimbalist, Sports, Jobs & Taxes: Are New Stadiums Worth the Cost?, 15
BROOKINGS REVIEW 35 (Summer 1997), available at
http://www.brook.edu/press/review/summer97/noll.htm (last visited Oct. 15, 2003).127 Id
128 Id.
Id.
130 Id.
131 Id
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High expectations attach themselves to stadium plans. During the Giuliani
administration, New York City commissioned a study on the prospect of a new ballpark
for the Yankees on the West Side of Manhattan. The study estimated the new stadium
would create $100 million in annual income, but the Giuliani administration advertised it
as creating ten times that amount.132 However, the position that sports stadiums are such
engines of economic development is dubious. 133 "Baltimore's Oriole Park at Camden
Yards, often cited as the most successful of the new stadiums, illustrates the point."134
Economists estimated that $41 million in additional spending by out-of-towners at
Camden Yards resulted in just 460 permanent jobs in the Baltimore metropolitan area. 135
"While higher attendance combined with higher ticket prices have generated $16 million
more a year for the Orioles, the stadium authority is losing $9 million a year," and the
"incomes of Maryland residents would be $11 million more a year if Camden Yards had
not been built."'136 "Courts have ruled that leagues must have 'reasonable' relocation
rules that preclude anticompetitive denial of relocation." 137  Baseball, because of its
antitrust exemption, appears "freer to limit team movements than the other sports."'
138
The Curt Flood Act of 1998
Following 1994-95's catastrophic baseball strike, Congress passed the Curt Flood
Act of 1998, which said "challenges to league rules that restrict player movement or
compensation would be subject to antitrust laws." 139 The Curt Flood Act of 1998 states,
in part:
132 See Peter Passell, Local Payoff on a Stadium is Uncertain, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1998, at D1.
See id
134 Id.135 Id.
136Id. This loss must only be greater now. The retirement of Orioles' legend Cal Ripken, combined with
the team's poor play over the past five years, have draw fewer and fewer people to Camden Yards.
Attendance has dipped from nearly 46,000 spectators per home date in 1997 to just over 33,000-although
the latter figure still ranked third out of fourteen American League teams-in 2002. See Baltimore Orioles
Attendance, Stadiums and Park Factors, at http://www.baseball-reference.com/teams/BAL/attend.shtml
(last visited Feb. 14, 2003).
137 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 126. For the most famous application of this rule, see Los Angeles
Memorial Coliseum Comm h. v. Nat I Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that the
NFL's rule requiring three-quarters approval by its members before a team could move into another
member's home territory did not withstand the rule of reason as applied to restraints of trade).
138 Noll & Zimbalist, supra note 126. MLB rules require twenty-three of thirty owners to permit a
franchise relocation. MLB officials also consider not only the scope of a franchise's territorial rights, but
the area encompassing its media market, which is broader. No MLB team has relocated to the Washington
area since the Senators became the Texas Rangers following the 1971 season. Washington is again the
subject of relocation, as Baltimore Orioles owner opposes relocating a struggling franchise to the District of
Columbia or Northern Virginia. See generally Mark Asher, Lawsuit Delaying Decision on Expos,
WASH[NGTON POST, Sept. 14, 2002, at D1.
139See Darren Rovell, Baseball s Antitrust Exemption: Q & A, at
http://espn.go.com/mlb/s/2001/1205/1290707.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2003). The Supreme Court held
two years earlier that unionized employees may not file antitrust suits; thus, in the 2002 round of labor
negotiations, speculation existed that the players might decertify their union in order to sue under antitrust.
Id.
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(a)Subject to subsections (b) through (d), the conduct, acts, practices, or
agreements of persons in the business of organized professional major
league baseball directly relating to or affecting employment of major
league baseball players to play baseball at the major league level are
subject to the antitrust laws to the same extent such conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements would be subject to the antitrust laws if engaged
in by persons in any other professional sports business affecting interstate
commerce.
(b)No court shall rely on the enactment of this section as a basis for
changing the application of the antitrust laws to any conduct, acts,
practices, or agreements other than those set forth in subsection (a). This
section does not create, permit or imply a cause of action by which to
challenge under the antitrust laws, or otherwise apply the antitrust laws to,
any conduct, acts, practices, or agreements that do not directly relate to or
affect employment of major league baseball players to play baseball at the
major league level,...
In addition, the Curt Flood Act does not affect minor leaguers or those entering
the amateur draft; 14 1 the relationship between MLB and the minor leagues; 142 franchise
relocation or expansion or any other issue directly between the commissioner and the
league owners; as well as MLB's marketing, sales, and intellectual property rights.
143
Also unaffected is any conduct covered by the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961,44 the
league's umpires, and any other persons or conduct outside the framework of MLB. 45
Only a "major league player" as defined in the Act may have standing to sue under this
section. 1
46
The force of the Curt Flood Act is unclear. For instance, during the labor
negotiations of 2001-02, MLB commissioner Bud Selig threatened to contract apparently
unprofitable franchises. 147  A bill called the "Fairness in Antitrust in National Sports
(FANS)" sponsored by representative John Conyers and senators Paul Wellstone and
Mark Dayton threatened to strip the antitrust exemption as it applies to MLB's efforts to
control relocation and contraction. 14 8  However, some legislators and antitrust experts
say "an antitrust challenge might actually reveal that baseball is not protected in this area,
140 15 U.S.C. § 26(a)-(b) (1998).
141 § 26(b)(1).
142 § 26(b)(2).
143 § 26(b)(3).
144 § 26(b)(4).
145 § 26(b)(5).
146 § 26(c).
147See, e.g., Hamm, supra note 125.
148 See, e.g., Rovell, supra note 139.
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since it has never been explicitly challenged in court."'149 For instance, the Senate
Judiciary Committee chairman has commented that:
In the best-reasoned recent lower court opinion on this topic, Judge
Padova of the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania in Piazza v. Major League Baseball150 concluded in 1993
that the judicially-created and unique antitrust exemption for major league
baseball was limited to the reserve system. That case involved the possible
relocation of a team, and the District Court held that no baseball antitrust
exemption prevented it from applying the law. Similarly, in Butterworth
v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, Inc.151 involving a
challenge to major league baseball's refusal to allow a group of investors
to buy the San Francisco Giants and move the team to Tampa Bay, the
Florida Supreme Court held in 1994 that no judicially-created federal
antitrust exemption barred it from considering the proper application of
federal law to protect competition and thereby consumers.
Between the narrowness of the way the Supreme Court had
perpetuated baseball's antitrust exemption-- only as it applied to labor-
management relations-- and our work in the Congress, in which we struck
the last remaining remnant of the judicially-created exception to the
applicability of the antitrust laws, it seems that there is no longer any basis
to contend that a general, free-floating baseball antitrust exemption
somehow continues to exist.
Nor has such a special antitrust exemption been justified. When the
Committee was engaged in hearings in 1995 that led to passage of the Curt
Flood Act, after the work stoppage in 1994 and the lamentable and historic
canceling of the World Series, David Cone, an outstanding major league
pitcher, testified and offered a trenchant question. He asked: If baseball
were coming to Congress today to ask us to provide a statutory antitrust
exemption, would we? That is the question I repeat today. What about
major league baseball, as distinct from other professional sports and
businesses, entitles it to special rules of law?
152
To date, Senator Leahy's question in closing remains unanswered-as it has been since
the days of Oliver Wendell Holmes.
149 Id
150 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
151 644 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 1994).
152 Sen. Patrick Leahy, Opening Statement of Senator Leahy on the Applicability of Federal Antitrust Laws
to Major League Baseball, at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200202/021302.html (last visited Feb. 10,
2003).
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